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If you're going to include problems that are not Boeing’s fault along with problems that are their fault, then it;’s only fair to post the same for Airbus. All that award stuff is irrelevant. I want to know about both, or neither, not just one of them. I fly on both. So let’s be fair. One thread may be shorter than the other, but that doesn’t matter. Be fair.
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No one would want to talk about the A320 neo with the winglets having wing cracking issues, or the A321 freighter having fuselage cracks....
At one point during the examination, the air-safety agency observed mechanics at Spirit using a hotel key card to check a door seal, according to a document that describes some of the findings. That action was “not identified/documented/called-out in the production order,” the document said.
In another instance, the FAA saw Spirit mechanics apply liquid Dawn soap to a door seal “as lubricant in the fit-up process,” according to the document. The door seal was then cleaned with a wet cheesecloth, the document said, noting that instructions were “vague and unclear on what specifications/actions are to be followed or recorded by the mechanic.”
At one point during the examination, the air-safety agency observed mechanics at Spirit using a hotel key card to check a door seal, according to a document that describes some of the findings. That action was “not identified/documented/called-out in the production order,” the document said.
In another instance, the FAA saw Spirit mechanics apply liquid Dawn soap to a door seal “as lubricant in the fit-up process,” according to the document. The door seal was then cleaned with a wet cheesecloth, the document said, noting that instructions were “vague and unclear on what specifications/actions are to be followed or recorded by the mechanic.”
Boeing has had its share of in-house discrepant machined parts, poor fit-ups in assy areas, failing anti corrosion treatments, poor finishing practices, and a host of other issues that add up to a less than desirable product. The fact that the company sees the FAA, and it's own QA group as the enemy is an important tell when considering this isn't news among the crews who build the parts and assemble the aircraft. The vendors simply took to the "Boeing way" when they saw the focus on quality quickly bow down to the schedule..
I was told on so many occasions, "just get it done," or, "get that young guy in inspection to buy it off." Or, "sell it on second shift." Twenty years of the bosses in Renton paying little heed to the specs, twenty years of them advocating for "when in doubt--ship it out." I'd have to say that these newest revelations are only the tip of the iceberg awaiting Boeing's attempts to navigate their way around these less than stellar findings.
I was shocked to find them so eager to jam out such a potentially dangerous product, I challenged many supervisors when confronted with their encouragement to meet the numbers while caring nothing about the quality mandate we were supposedly working to. I told a Renton supervisor about the discrepant seals we observed on flight control wing mechanisms, he sarcastically stated that "I'd love to have my mother be proud of all our efforts, but it just doesn't work that way." He noted that the work was "bought off" by another QA organization and that was satisfactory to him, so "lets get er done." I could tell many more tales of malfeasance by Boeing managers but it suffices to say that they have had, and still have, a deep problem with quality.
The entirety of the quality system is seen as a roadblock to production, and that is the number one issue at this time. Simply for the fact that this has become the alt-culture that lies alongside the "official" proclamations by the absentee management in Chicago. At the factory level it's a numbers game, and managers are cautioned to keep at a minimum the rejection tag count, often interfering with the crews and their QA counterparts to write a "pickup" a much less consequential report, or worse, they cajole the QA into a no documentation deal while promising to get a fix done quickly. My guess is that the door plug issue was somehow accomplished in this manner. Supposedly EVERY discrepant part or fit-up is documented, and the fix is supposed to be provided by engineering, not the boss.
I witnessed plenty of retaliation for the sin of holding up production schedules, the holy grail of Boeing lies in the so called firing order, the plan that shows the line up of finished planes and every day that schedule gets behind something has to give elsewhere. In short, Boeing is a schedule driven company that holds profit up as the supreme consideration, and any top exec that doesn't agree with that will never be considered worthy of advancement. So there you have it, it's not that they are making common mistakes, no, the problems are imbedded in a cultural bias against quality measures that impede production.. My first month in the company I was politely told by a general supervisor that "I've never seen anyone get fired for poor quality but, not meeting schedule is a sure path out the door for management..."
My guess is that the door plug issue was somehow accomplished in this manner. Supposedly EVERY discrepant part or fit-up is documented, and the fix is supposed to be provided by engineering, not the boss.
According to Boeing, the shift lead for the day that door plug was mucked around with is on medical leave and can't be reached, and isn't that just convenient?
Boeing has had its share of in-house discrepant machined parts, poor fit-ups in assy areas, failing anti corrosion treatments, poor finishing practices, and a host of other issues that add up to a less than desirable product. The fact that the company sees the FAA, and it's own QA group as the enemy is an important tell when considering this isn't news among the crews who build the parts and assemble the aircraft. The vendors simply took to the "Boeing way" when they saw the focus on quality quickly bow down to the schedule..
I was told on so many occasions, "just get it done," or, "get that young guy in inspection to buy it off." Or, "sell it on second shift." Twenty years of the bosses in Renton paying little heed to the specs, twenty years of them advocating for "when in doubt--ship it out." I'd have to say that these newest revelations are only the tip of the iceberg awaiting Boeing's attempts to navigate their way around these less than stellar findings.
I was shocked to find them so eager to jam out such a potentially dangerous product, I challenged many supervisors when confronted with their encouragement to meet the numbers while caring nothing about the quality mandate we were supposedly working to. I told a Renton supervisor about the discrepant seals we observed on flight control wing mechanisms, he sarcastically stated that "I'd love to have my mother be proud of all our efforts, but it just doesn't work that way." He noted that the work was "bought off" by another QA organization and that was satisfactory to him, so "lets get er done." I could tell many more tales of malfeasance by Boeing managers but it suffices to say that they have had, and still have, a deep problem with quality.
The entirety of the quality system is seen as a roadblock to production, and that is the number one issue at this time. Simply for the fact that this has become the alt-culture that lies alongside the "official" proclamations by the absentee management in Chicago. At the factory level it's a numbers game, and managers are cautioned to keep at a minimum the rejection tag count, often interfering with the crews and their QA counterparts to write a "pickup" a much less consequential report, or worse, they cajole the QA into a no documentation deal while promising to get a fix done quickly. My guess is that the door plug issue was somehow accomplished in this manner. Supposedly EVERY discrepant part or fit-up is documented, and the fix is supposed to be provided by engineering, not the boss.
I witnessed plenty of retaliation for the sin of holding up production schedules, the holy grail of Boeing lies in the so called firing order, the plan that shows the line up of finished planes and every day that schedule gets behind something has to give elsewhere. In short, Boeing is a schedule driven company that holds profit up as the supreme consideration, and any top exec that doesn't agree with that will never be considered worthy of advancement. So there you have it, it's not that they are making common mistakes, no, the problems are imbedded in a cultural bias against quality measures that impede production.. My first month in the company I was politely told by a general supervisor that "I've never seen anyone get fired for poor quality but, not meeting schedule is a sure path out the door for management..."
This is a great post. I have no work experience at Boeing and can only speculate. But I am an engineer who works with quality assurance in the medical device industry. I have over 20+ years of experience. I also have multiple master's degrees in mechanical, software, electrical, and biomedical engineering. I also am a data scientist. This post seems very realistic to me based on my experience.
Oftentimes, an engineering team will "cut corners" to meet the deadline. From the purview of statistical data, I saw one estimate that about 90% of software developers missed their deadline. For example, if a software system is scheduled for release early in Q2 (say April) and the dedline for development is in Q1 (say February 20), then that is often missed. The time of testing for quality assurance is oftetn reduced significantly. So, the month of testing that had been planned From February 21 to March 21 prior to release in early April is now reduced to about a week or even less. So, developers and testers are often forced to "cut corners", and a common way to do that is to reduce the amount of testing.
So, what does the reduction of testing mean? When it comes to hardware and software, the first test occurs with the design review. Next comes hardware testing and software testing or integration testing. The tests generally should have (ideally) positive tests for "happy" path scenarios, negative tests for error handling or failure analysis, and special value testing (edge cases). Now, when testers cut corners, the negative tests and special values tests may be omitted. Next, the number of positive tests may be reduced by a significant amount. This happens a lot in industry. I know this as an experienced software tester. It's very common for engineers to miss deadline and reduce testing to make the next deadline.
It sounds like that might have been in play here at Boeing. I defer to the engineers who have worked there directly.
In addition to being a long-time engineer, I am also a minority. A lot of posters have castigated DEI - diversity and inclusion. I am pesonally against affirmative action or any sort of "inclusion" that reduces standards to bring in more minorities. When I was in college, I saw how AA policies hurt minority students badly in many cases. In general, there were roughly two cohorts of minority students in STEM:
* Cohort A: unprepared minority students from low-quality schools that did not have the family support common in more affluent families (e.g. whites and Asians in Orange County, CA as opposed to East LA or a rural Indian Reservation). Students from Cohort A would often get admitted into rigorous STEM programs despite not having the test scores and plethora of AP courses completed in HS that was common among white and Asian students. These students of Cohort A usually dropped out of STEM or ended up on academic probation. The few that managed to survive the rigor of STEM had unusually good advising in spite of their poor HS background and a bizarre, all-out effort of living in the library and studying about 70+ hours of week to make up for a bad HS preparation. But that was rare. Most students from Cohort A just burnt out and left STEM. AA did not help them. But rather, AA set them up for failure. Dr. Richard Sanders of UCLA refers to this as the Mismatch Problem. It was a primary reason SCOTUS ended AA.
* Cohort B: prepared minority students who went to high-quality schools and grew up in affluent neighborhoods. A common example in Phoenix is Brophy Prep. Another one is Albuquerque Academy in NM. Both have many excellent minority students with very high test scores that are comparable to the rest of the admitted class of white and Asian students. So, cohort A represents students who would have gotten accepted without affirmative action. They typically do very well in STEM and do not suffer the burnout common in Cohort A.
So, when affirmative action was outlawed in Florida in 2000 or California in 1996, only minorities from Cohort B were accepted. The students from Cohort A were outright rejected and often had to go to a community college. But this actually helped them. They were properly matched. Rather than going to an elite STEM program at someplace like UCLA and flunking out, they could go to a small community college and do reasonably well for about 2-3 years then transfer into UCLA if they had good grades as juniors. The elimination of AA actually raised minority graduation rates overall.
Therefore, I am not a "DEI" guy. I am minority but do not condone that or AA. With that said, I have seen cases of DEI that involved incompetent minorities. Some really bad examples were product owners who spoke poor English. Product owners need to collaborate with many stakeholders and speak English efficiently. They also need to write hundreds of pages of requirements in a short time. If they can't speak English well, then the odds of a bad design are very high. Improper design was blamed for the Challenger Disaster. But if you called them out on it they would yell racism - even against other minorities like me. So, I have seen cases when DEI failed badly with incompetence. But I have also seen cases where the minority engineers were legitimate and not "invalid DEI". The problem is that some (not all) whites start to assume ALL minority engineers are DEI and ALL are incompetent. But the nuanced, objective view would reveal to them that there is a mix. But in any case, I agree that DEI should be eliminated.
With that said, I don't believe "DEI" is the sole factor in these issues at Boeing. As a data scientist, the causal factors could be (1) DEI, (2) improper process engineering, (3) design issues, (4) profit motive and cutting corners, (5) lack of proper testing, (6) corporate politics, (7) culture change, (8) offshore delegation, etc. DEI is not going to be the only reason if one views the data objectively. If DEI is blamed exclusively, then it would seem like classic 1950s white racism which still happens occasionally. But I'm old enough to know that isn't always the case.One of the best technicians I met had been a machinist and was trained in the US Navy as I recall. One day, he and I were alone in the machine shop. I was a green, inexperienced intern. He gave me the whole run-down on the flaws of process engineering and politics in that work environment. I'll never forget it. He made it clear there was a lot of incompetence in hiring of improperly trained machinists (regardless of ethnicity). Ever since that day, I learned to revere machinists trained in the US Navy. I wish I could thank that guy looking back. I think many engineers are reasonable and would look at the possible factors I noted above pragmatically.
It isn’t that airplanes are falling apart in mid-air, rather they are spreading souvenirs. Aaah, something to remember for those that never flew anywhere. How nice…
In fairness to Boeing and it's vendors, not all of these in flight safety incidents stem from factory negligence. Commercial aircraft are subject to periodic testing, the "check" system is a well planned event that each plane must undergo, it consists of an A,B,C, or D check, the D is known as a "heavy check" and requires major structural testing and other repairs and replacements that make for a near new aircraft. Recent incidents have called into question the efficacy of these checks in the modern business environment..
My point in earlier posts have included the fact that the quality issues in the Boeing company are the result of modern business practices that reflect an unhealthy preoccupation with rewarding the shareholders at the expense of product quality. And yes, the Airlines themselves are just as bad if not worse when it comes to profits being the main focus, with the passengers, the crews, and yes the aircraft itself coming in second as the red headed stepchild in their business plan.
This has become part of our national malaise as consumers or workers, we are being told that we may have to forgo our expectations of great service, long lasting products, and yes, even our safety concerns are being dismissed as secondary concerns. Politicians have been successful at dodging the meat and potato issues that openly challenge their coddling of the "donor class" which includes Boeing and the airlines. The FAA needs to step up and present Boeing, it's vendors, and the airlines, with real and painful consequences when they treat us and our government with disrespect. Shareholder value considerations should never trump our democratic constructs..
In fairness to Boeing and it's vendors, not all of these in flight safety incidents stem from factory negligence. Commercial aircraft are subject to periodic testing, the "check" system is a well planned event that each plane must undergo, it consists of an A,B,C, or D check, the D is known as a "heavy check" and requires major structural testing and other repairs and replacements that make for a near new aircraft. Recent incidents have called into question the efficacy of these checks in the modern business environment..
My point in earlier posts have included the fact that the quality issues in the Boeing company are the result of modern business practices that reflect an unhealthy preoccupation with rewarding the shareholders at the expense of product quality. And yes, the Airlines themselves are just as bad if not worse when it comes to profits being the main focus, with the passengers, the crews, and yes the aircraft itself coming in second as the red headed stepchild in their business plan.
This has become part of our national malaise as consumers or workers, we are being told that we may have to forgo our expectations of great service, long lasting products, and yes, even our safety concerns are being dismissed as secondary concerns. Politicians have been successful at dodging the meat and potato issues that openly challenge their coddling of the "donor class" which includes Boeing and the airlines. The FAA needs to step up and present Boeing, it's vendors, and the airlines, with real and painful consequences when they treat us and our government with disrespect. Shareholder value considerations should never trump our democratic constructs..
Yes, it's got to be more painful to behave negligently re quality and safety considerations than it is to be second to market with a new plane design, or else, Boeing will continue to treat the ensuing fines and lawsuits as merely the cost of doing business, and continue making the same Machiavellian tradeoffs.
Yes, Boeing twice lucky - no one killed in this incident of their plane shedding parts en route either. I will say that this time it's an older plane, not a brand new plane with pieces flying off. So this could be a case of the airline being negligent with maintenance checks or repairs.
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